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REEFER MADNESS — THE FEDERAL 
RESPONSE TO CALIFORNIA’S 
MEDICAL-MARIJUANA LAW
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
ARIJUANA is unique among illegal drugs
in its political symbolism, its safety, and its
wide use. More than 65 million Americans
have tried marijuana, the use of which is not associ-
ated with increased mortality.1 Since the federal gov-
ernment first tried to tax it out of existence in 1937,
at least partly in response to the 1936 film Reefer
Madness, marijuana has remained at the center of
controversy. Now physicians are becoming more ac-
tively involved. Most recently, the federal drug pol-
icy against any use of marijuana has been challenged
by California’s attempt to legalize its use by certain
patients on the recommendation of their physicians.
The federal government responded by threatening
California physicians who recommend marijuana to
their sick patients with investigation and the loss of
their prescription privileges under Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) regulations.2
The editor-in-chief of the Journal suggested that
prohibiting physicians from helping their suffering
patients by suggesting that they use marijuana is
“misguided, heavy-handed, and inhumane.”3 He rec-
ommended that marijuana be reclassified as a Sched-
ule II drug and made available by prescription with-
out the usual requirement of controlled clinical trials.
Many states, including Massachusetts, had previously
passed laws that permitted their citizens to use mar-
ijuana for medicinal purposes under some circum-
stances.4 California’s law seems to have engendered
a uniquely harsh federal response because California
is a large, trend-setting state; because its new mari-
juana law is very broad as compared with others; and
because the law was passed by popular referendum.
In this article I will discuss the new California law
and its implications for physicians.
THE CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION
In the fall of 1996, California voters approved the
Medical Marijuana Initiative (Proposition 215) by a
vote of 56 to 44 percent. The act is entitled the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996, and its purpose is
to give Californians the right to possess and cultivate
marijuana for medical purposes “where that medical
use is deemed appropriate and has been recom-
mended by a physician who has determined that the
M
person’s health would benefit from the use of mari-
juana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS,
chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine,
or any other illness for which marijuana provides re-
lief.”5 Nothing in the act permits persons using mar-
ijuana for medical purposes to engage in conduct
that endangers others (such as driving while under
its influence), condones “the diversion of marijuana
for nonmedical purposes,” or permits the buying or
selling of marijuana.5 The two operative sections of
the law are as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician
in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or priv-
ilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for
medical purposes.
[Existing California law] relating to the possession of mar-
ijuana [and the] cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply
to a patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver [the person
who has consistently assumed responsibility for the pa-
tient’s housing, health, or safety] who possesses or culti-
vates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the
patient upon the written or oral recommendation or ap-
proval of a physician.5
The primary purpose of this law is to provide a
specified group of patients with an affirmative de-
fense to the charge of possession or cultivation of
marijuana, the defense of medical necessity. To use
this defense, the patient must be able to show that
his or her physician recommended or approved of
the use of marijuana, either orally or in writing. Ob-
viously, a note from a physician is better evidence
than a simple assertion that “my doctor said this
would be good for me,” and most patients will want
a written statement to help protect them from prob-
lems with the police. Nothing in this law changes
current law against buying or selling marijuana or af-
fects federal law; it merely provides that qualified pa-
tients and their primary care givers can possess and
cultivate their own marijuana for personal medicinal
purposes, without violating state drug laws.
COMPASSION AND THE USE OF 
UNAPPROVED DRUGS
The federal government has been in the business
of regulating drugs for almost a century, and few ex-
ceptions have ever been made to the basic rules of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even for
patients with cancer or AIDS. In 1979, for example,
the FDA was successful in convincing a unanimous
U.S. Supreme Court that Congress intended no ex-
ception for terminally ill patients who sought to take
laetrile, an unapproved drug, for cancer. The FDA’s
primary rationale was that the use of this unap-
proved and useless drug could prevent patients from
seeking conventional treatments for cancer that of-
fered them at least some chance of a cure.6 Under
President Ronald Reagan, however, the FDA re-
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sponded with a great deal more flexibility to the
AIDS epidemic and permitted the use and sale of
drugs not yet approved (but in use in ongoing clin-
ical trials) if, among other things, “the drug [was]
intended to treat a serious or immediately life-
threatening disease.”7 More surprisingly, the FDA
also permitted individual patients to import unap-
proved drugs from other countries for their person-
al, medical use.8 These regulations were almost pure-
ly political, had no scientific basis, and tended to
conflate treatment and research and to undermine
the very purpose of clinical trials.8 The theory used
to justify these exceptions to federal drug laws was
the very one rejected by the Supreme Court: termi-
nally ill patients have “nothing to lose” and should
not be deprived of the hope (even the false hope)
that they might escape death.6,8
Given this history, it is not surprising that the ad-
vocates of the medicinal use of marijuana concen-
trate their reform efforts on helping patients with
cancer ameliorate the adverse effects of chemother-
apy and helping patients with AIDS counteract weight
loss and fight their disease. Virtually no one thinks
it is reasonable to initiate criminal prosecution of pa-
tients with cancer or AIDS who use marijuana on
the advice of their physicians to help them through
conventional medical treatment for their disease.
Anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of smoked
marijuana abounds.9 Perhaps the most convincing is
the account of Harvard professor and author Stephen
Jay Gould, one of the world’s first survivors of ab-
dominal mesothelioma. When Gould started intra-
venous chemotherapy, he writes:
Absolutely nothing in the available arsenal of anti-emetics
worked at all. I was miserable and came to dread the fre-
quent treatments with an almost perverse intensity. I had
heard that marijuana often worked well against nausea. I
was reluctant to try it because I have never smoked any
substance habitually (and didn’t even know how to in-
hale). Moreover, I had tried marijuana twice [in the
1960s] . . . and had hated it. . . . Marijuana worked
like a charm. . . . The sheer bliss of not experiencing
nausea — and not having to fear it for all the days inter-
vening between treatments — was the greatest boost I re-
ceived in all my year of treatment, and surely the most im-
portant effect upon my eventual cure.10
Similarly, in patients with AIDS, marijuana has been
credited with counteracting such side effects of treat-
ment as severe nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite,
and fatigue, as well as with stimulating the appetite
to help prevent weight loss.
THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE
Had the California proposition been limited to
the use of marijuana for terminal illnesses such as
cancer and AIDS, it would probably have caused
much less concern. Arizona passed a much broader
initiative that permitted physicians to prescribe any
drug on Schedule I, but in April 1997, the Arizona
legislature amended the law to apply only to drugs
approved by the FDA, thus effectively repealing it.11
The California law applies only to marijuana but
makes it available for a wide range of medical con-
ditions, including anorexia, pain, spasticity, glau-
coma, arthritis, migraine, “or any other illness for
which marijuana provides relief.”5 This very broad
definition of the potential medicinal uses of marijua-
na seemed an explicit endorsement of the drug itself,
which the Clinton administration and others be-
lieved to be sending the wrong message to America’s
youth. After thinking about the issue for approxi-
mately two months, the Clinton administration an-
nounced that it would vigorously oppose the imple-
mentation of the California proposition and the
Arizona law.2
Barry McCaffrey, director of the Office of Nation-
al Drug Control Policy, announced at a White House
news conference on December 30, 1996, that “noth-
ing has changed. Federal law is unaffected by these
propositions.”2 McCaffrey expressed concern about
marijuana as a “gateway drug” and about the poten-
tial impact of the law on children. As for the poten-
tial medicinal uses of marijuana, he said:
This is not a medical proposition. This is the legalization
of drugs that we’re concerned about. Here’s what the
medical advisor in the state of California saw as the poten-
tial uses of marijuana. [Here McCaffrey showed a slide.]
. . . It includes recalling forgotten memories, cough sup-
pressants, Parkinson’s disease, writer’s cramp. This is not
medicine. This is a Cheech and Chong show. And now
what we are committed to doing is to look in a scientific
way at any proposition that would bring a new medicine
to the assistance of the American medical establishment.2
Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala said that the initiatives reinforced the grow-
ing belief among Americans that marijuana is not
harmful, whereas the administration remained “op-
posed to the legalization of marijuana [because] all
available research has concluded that marijuana is
dangerous to our health.”2 Nonetheless, she did say
that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) would
continue to support and review “peer-reviewed” and
“scientifically valid” research on “the possible use-
fulness of smoked marijuana in the limited circum-
stances where available medications have failed to
provide relief for individual patients.”2
Finally, Attorney General Janet Reno announced
that physicians who followed the terms of the Cali-
fornia law would be the new targets of federal law
enforcement (instead of drug dealers) and threat-
ened physicians with loss of their registrations with
the DEA and with exclusion from participation in
Medicare and Medicaid. She stated:
Federal law still applies. . . . U.S. attorneys in both states
will continue to review cases for prosecution and DEA of-
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ficials will review cases as they have to determine whether
to revoke the registration of any physician who recom-
mends or prescribes so-called Schedule I controlled sub-
stances. We will not turn a blind eye toward our responsi-
bility to enforce federal law and to preserve the integrity
of medical and scientific process to determine if drugs have
medical value before allowing them to be used.2
DOCTOR–PATIENT CONVERSATIONS
Two basic issues are raised by the administration’s
position. One involves government regulation of
doctor–patient conversations, and the other the qual-
ity of evidence necessary to make marijuana available
by prescription. A group of California physicians
filed suit against McCaffrey, Reno, and Shalala, ar-
guing that the threats of prosecution against physi-
cians for talking to their patients violate their First
Amendment rights and interfere with their ability as
physicians to use “their best medical judgment in
the context of a bona fide physician–patient rela-
tionship.”12
In the only comparable case to reach the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the Court narrowly upheld a gag rule
related to discussing abortion in a federally funded
Title X family-planning clinic.13 The Court upheld
the gag rule because Congress could reasonably
limit the types of medical services available at a fed-
erally funded facility.14 The Court was able to side-
step the First Amendment issue because patients (at
least in theory) had access to other doctors who had
an obligation to furnish them with full information,
and the doctor–patient relationship in a Title X
clinic was characterized as not “all-encompassing”
but, rather, as limited only to preconception coun-
seling:
The Title X program regulations do not significantly im-
pinge upon the doctor–patient relationship. Nothing in
them requires a doctor to represent as [his or her] own any
opinion that [he or she] does not in fact hold. Nor is the
doctor–patient relationship established by expectation on
the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice.
The program does not provide post-conception medical
care, and therefore a doctor’s silence with regard to abor-
tion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into
thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an ap-
propriate option for her.13
Even if one accepts this unconvincing rationale, it
is impossible to apply it to California physicians
who believe that marijuana would be beneficial for
their patients and who are providing their overall
health care. Patients receiving care for cancer or
AIDS rightfully and reasonably expect and are enti-
tled to full disclosure and discussion of available
treatment options. The California physicians are on
strong legal ground with their lawsuit, and they
should prevail. In early April, U.S. District Court
judge Fern M. Smith granted a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the DEA from carrying out its
threats against California physicians and encouraged
the litigants to try to work out a settlement of the
dispute.15
In response to the lawsuit and the growing oppo-
sition to its threats to physicians, the administration
issued a clarifying letter, essentially stating that phy-
sicians may discuss marijuana with their patients so
long as they do not recommend its use.16 This pro-
vides no guidance at all. Of course doctors can talk
to patients; the question is what they can tell them.
The real subject of dispute remains whether phy-
sicians can “recommend” marijuana (and thereby
grant their patients immunity from state prosecu-
tion), as the California proposition provides. Would,
for example, telling a patient with cancer that other
physicians have reported that marijuana has given
their patients relief from nausea constitute a “recom-
mendation”?
Judge Smith made it clear that the First Amend-
ment protects physician–patient communications and
that the government has no authority to determine
the content of physicians’ speech.15 She also con-
cluded that the federal statements regarding threat-
ened prosecution were vague and thus could lead to
physicians’ censuring their own speech to avoid pos-
sible federal prosecution. On the other hand, she
noted (correctly) that the First Amendment does
not protect “speech that is itself criminal because
[the speech is] too intertwined with illegal activi-
ty.”15 Under federal drug laws, which cannot be af-
fected by legislation in California, it remains a crime
for physicians to aid, abet, or conspire — by speech
or action — to violate federal criminal statutes.
Thus, it is not a violation of the First Amendment
for the federal government to prosecute or threaten
to prosecute physicians who specifically intend to
aid, abet, or conspire with their patients to violate
federal drug laws.
Judge Smith could have added that to prevail in
such a case the government will have to prove more
than simply that the physician recommended mari-
juana as worth trying for a medical condition. The
“more” will include evidence that the physician
“associated himself with the venture” of illegally
purchasing marijuana “as something he wished to
bring about and sought by his actions to make suc-
ceed.”17 This should require at least that the physi-
cian identify a source of the marijuana, and some
connection between that source and the physi-
cian.18 It is only speech short of this that the injunc-
tion covers. Of course, this formulation still leaves
it uncertain exactly how far physicians may go in
recommending marijuana use before the federal
government is justified in prosecuting them for
criminal behavior. Judge Smith concluded with an
understatement: “This injunction does not provide
physicians with the level of certainty for which they
had hoped.”15
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MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE
Attempts to have marijuana reassigned from Sched-
ule I to Schedule II began almost immediately after
Congress passed the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act of 1970, which established the current system of
drug classification. The following findings must be
made to place a drug on Schedule I: “(A) The
drug . . . has a high potential for abuse; (B) The
drug . . . has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States; and (C) there is a
lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under
medical supervision.” Part A for Schedule II drugs
is identical; the other requirements are “(B) The
drug . . . has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States . . . and (C) Abuse
of the drug . . . may lead to severe psychological
or physical dependence.”
In 1988, after two years of hearings, DEA ad-
ministrative-law judge Francis Young recommended
shifting marijuana to Schedule II on the grounds
that it was safe and had a “currently accepted med-
ical use in treatment.”19 Specifically, Judge Young
found that “marijuana, in its natural form, is one of
the safest therapeutically active substances known to
man. . . . At present it is estimated that marijuana’s
LD-50 [median lethal dose] is around 1:20,000 or
1:40,000. In layman’s terms . . . a smoker would
theoretically have to consume 20,000 to 40,000
times as much marijuana as is contained in one mar-
ijuana cigarette . . . nearly 1500 pounds of mari-
juana within about fifteen minutes to induce a lethal
response.” As for medical use, the judge concluded,
among other things, that marijuana “has a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States for nausea and vomiting resulting from che-
motherapy treatments.”19 The administrator of the
DEA rejected Young’s recommendation, on the ba-
sis that there was no scientific evidence showing that
marijuana was better than other approved drugs for
any specific medical condition. Further attempts to
get the courts to reclassify marijuana have been un-
successful.
Reacting to a DEA suggestion that only a “fringe
group” of oncologists accepted marijuana as an an-
tiemetic agent, a survey of a random sample of the
members of the American Society of Clinical Oncol-
ogy was undertaken in 1990.20 More than 1000 on-
cologists responded to the survey, and 44 percent of
them reported that they had recommended marijua-
na to at least one patient.20 Marijuana was believed
to be more effective than oral dronabinol (Marinol)
by the respondents: of those who believed they had
sufficient information to compare the two drugs di-
rectly, 44 percent believed marijuana was more ef-
fective, and only 13 percent believed dronabinol was
more effective.20 Of course, nothing in the FDA reg-
ulations requires a drug to be more effective than an
existing one for it to be approved. Nonetheless, in
the current anti-marijuana climate, the NIH has
consistently refused to fund research on marijuana.
In the wake of the California proposition, this posi-
tion is no longer tenable.
An NIH panel, after a two-day workshop in Feb-
ruary, recommended research on marijuana in the
areas of wasting associated with AIDS, nausea due
to cancer chemotherapy, glaucoma, and neuropathic
pain.21 This list seems reasonable, especially since
objective criteria such as weight gain, intraocular
pressure, and the frequency of vomiting can be used
to determine the drug’s effectiveness.
Such research may be difficult to do, but it is pos-
sible to compare orally administered dronabinol with
smoked marijuana. Some argue that because the
symptoms of nausea are so subjective and “extremely
difficult to quantify in controlled experiments,” mar-
ijuana should be available as a prescription drug on
a compassionate basis.3 In fact, current FDA regu-
lations provide the authority for making marijuana
available on a compassionate basis while such studies
are proceeding. Other support for its compassionate
use would appear to come from the Clinton admin-
istration’s solicitor general, Walter Dellinger, who ar-
gued before the Supreme Court less than two weeks
after the McCaffrey–Reno press conference that the
administration believed that Americans had a weak
constitutional right “not to suffer.” Although Del-
linger said he did not believe this right was broad
enough to prohibit the states from making physi-
cian-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients a
crime, it should certainly be broad enough to pro-
hibit the federal government from denying patients
with cancer and AIDS access to drugs that could
help them withstand potentially life-saving treat-
ments.
WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?
The final argument that the administration makes
against any medical use of marijuana is that this
would send the “wrong message” to children, who
would then use this “gateway drug” and get hooked
on much more harmful substances, such as cocaine
and heroin. There are two responses to this argu-
ment. The first is provided by Boston Globe colum-
nist Ellen Goodman, who asks, “What is the infa-
mous signal being sent to [children]? . . . If you
hurry up and get cancer, you, too, can get high?”22
The second response relates to the “gateway” is-
sue itself. A 1994 survey found that 17 percent of
current marijuana users said they had tried cocaine
and only 0.2 percent of those who had not used
marijuana had tried cocaine.23 One way to interpret
these data is that children who smoke marijuana are
85 times as likely as others to try cocaine; another is
that 83 percent of pot smokers, or five out of six,
never try cocaine.23 Honesty is likely to make a
greater and more lasting impression on our children
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than political posturing and hysteria. Many people
want to make marijuana legal for everyone. But op-
position to the legalization of marijuana generally is
not a good reason to keep it from patients who are
suffering. Making marijuana a Schedule II drug
does not make it widely acceptable or available any
more than classifying medicinal cocaine as a Sched-
ule II drug made it acceptable or available.
CONCLUSIONS
Doctors are not the enemy in the “war” on drugs;
ignorance and hypocrisy are. Research should go on,
and while it does, marijuana should be available to
all patients who need it to help them undergo treat-
ment for life-threatening illnesses. There is certainly
sufficient evidence to reclassify marijuana as a Sched-
ule II drug. Unlike quack remedies such as laetrile,
marijuana is not claimed to be a treatment in itself;
instead, it is used to help patients withstand the ef-
fect of accepted treatment that can lead to a cure or
amelioration of their condition. As long as a therapy
is safe and has not been proved ineffective, seriously
ill patients (and their physicians) should have access
to whatever they need to fight for their lives.
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